Daniel Dennett gives a counterargument to the Chinese room example and Searle's conclusion concerning the mind. Dennett claims that the example is making the reader search for the mind in the wrong place. The "intuition pump" (to use his terminology) is trying to get you to place the mind of the room in the man, and because the mind cannot be said to be in the man, the room has no mind. However, the mind isn't in the man, it is the room, and more specifically, the book in the room. The book would have to sufficiently complex to pass the Turing test, that it could be said to be as complex as the human mind. The man in the room is only the hardware, the computer processing unit. What is rational is the program, the book, which is written in language and is cognizable. By analogy, the brain at the micro level cannot be said to contain the mind. It's only at the level of abstraction from the hardware that the mind becomes apparent. What do you make of Dennett's counterpoint to Searle? Should we conclude the room is analogous to a mind, or is there still something missing to make that conclusion?

Daniel Dennett gives a counterargument to the Chinese room example and Searle’s conclusion concerning the mind. Dennett claims that the example is making the reader search for the mind in the wrong place. The “intuition pump” (to use his terminology) is trying to get you to place the mind of the room in the man, and because the mind cannot be said to be in the man, the room has no mind. However, the mind isn’t in the man, it is the room, and more specifically, the book in the room. The book would have to sufficiently complex to pass the Turing test, that it could be said to be as complex as the human mind. The man in the room is only the hardware, the computer processing unit. What is rational is the program, the book, which is written in language and is cognizable. By analogy, the brain at the micro level cannot be said to contain the mind. It’s only at the level of abstraction from the hardware that the mind becomes apparent. What do you make of Dennett’s counterpoint to Searle? Should we conclude the room is analogous to a mind, or is there still something missing to make that conclusion?

Daniel Dennett gives a counterargument to the Chinese room example and Searle’s conclusion concerning the mind. Dennett claims that the example is making the reader search for the mind in the wrong place. The “intuition pump” (to use his terminology) is trying to get you to place the mind of the room in the man, and because the mind cannot be said to be in the man, the room has no mind. However, the mind isn’t in the man, it is the room, and more specifically, the book in the room. The book would have to sufficiently complex to pass the Turing test, that it could be said to be as complex as the human mind. The man in the room is only the hardware, the computer processing unit. What is rational is the program, the book, which is written in language and is cognizable. By analogy, the brain at the micro level cannot be said to contain the mind. It’s only at the level of abstraction from the hardware that the mind becomes apparent. What do you make of Dennett’s counterpoint to Searle? Should we conclude the room is analogous to a mind, or is there still something missing to make that conclusion?